investments they keep for their own portfolios. 5 These two activities, and particularly the second one, have driven the rapid growth and high profitability of the two companies in recent years. 6 In the early 2000s, the two companies were hit by accounting scandals. 7 The fallout of these scandals led to a slowdown in their growth as their regulators and Congress took steps to limit their activities. 8 Just as they put some distance between themselves and their scandals, the ongoing credit crisis began to unfold in 2007. Despite their denials, the two companies had significant exposure to the subprime and Alt-A mortgage markets. 9 Their underwriting of the prime market had also been overly optimistic and the two companies began posting losses that are now being measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars. 10 As the extent of their problems began to come into focus, Congress passed the 
I. The Government Sponsored Enterprise

15
The special privileges accorded a GSE are variants on the longstanding government practice of spurring private investment in various arenas by granting some privilege or monopoly power to a party that will infuse the activity with needed capital or bring focused attention to it. For example, governmentgranted monopolies can take the form of a charter granting a monopoly on trade, such as the one granted
Congress has a long history of relying upon government sponsored enterprises to spur private investment. by Queen Elizabeth I to the English East India Company in 1600 in order to increase English trade with Asian nations. 16 They can take the form of a system such as that governing American patents, granting patent-holders the sole right to exploit a patent for a certain period in order to encourage innovation. 17 Or they can take the form of a regulated natural monopoly, like a utility company, that is regulated not only to protect consumers from monopoly pricing but also to ensure that the company can make a fair return on its investment. 18 Congress typically relies on the GSE structure to provide liquidity to a fragmented credit market. The introduction of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) in the 1970s changed that; once mortgages are converted into RMBS, they can be Borrowers get mortgages from lenders in the primary market;
In the simplest terms, this is how it works: 31 2. primary market lenders then sell these mortgages to secondary mortgage market firms and use the proceeds to originate more mortgages in the primary market; 32 3. the secondary mortgage market firms then sell securities backed by the mortgages that they purchased to investors and use the proceeds of the sale to purchase more mortgages from primary market lenders. The GSEs' charters restrict the mortgages they may buy. 41 In general, they may only buy mortgages with loan-to-value ratios of eighty percent or less unless the mortgage carries mortgage insurance or other credit support 42 and may not buy mortgages with principal amounts greater than an amount set each year. 43 Loans that comply with the restrictions placed on Fannie and Freddie are known as "conforming" loans. 44 Those that do not comply with either of these restrictions are known as "nonconforming" loans, which may not be purchased by Fannie or Freddie.
45
The two companies effectively have no competition in the conforming market because of advantages granted to them by the federal government in their charters. While Fannie Mae had created a secondary market for government guaranteed and insured residential mortgage loans prior to 1970, the broad secondary market began in earnest with the passage of the EHFA, which allowed both GSEs to purchase and securitize conventional mortgages as well as government-insured or guaranteed mortgages. 68 In the late 1970s, RMBS securitization took off as traditional lenders could not keep up with the demand for home mortgages. 
Investment in RMBS
exploded again after institutional investors entered the market; indeed, the RMBS market has increased by more than five hundred percent from 1984 through the early 2000s. 70 Starting in the late 1970s, nonfederal-related issuers, such as commercial banks and mortgage companies, began to issue "private label"
RMBS, a market that exploded in the ensuing years. 71 Commentators have argued that Fannie and Freddie effectively have a duopoly in the conforming mortgage market because they can borrow money so much more cheaply than their competitors, thereby excluding them from that market.
The subprime boom and bust of the 2000s took place in large part in this "private label" RMBS market. 72 Unlike pure duopolists, Fannie and Freddie's duopoly is limited by the nature of their competitive advantage: in an otherwise efficient market, the maximum amount that they can retain as duopoly profits is the spread between the interest rates they must pay and those that their competitors must pay. 73 And retain duopoly profits they do.
IV. Fannie and Freddie as Duopolists
74
If Fannie and Freddie were a duopoly, one might reasonably wonder whether their actions violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which forbids monopolization. 75 The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 2 to mean that the monopolization resulted from "the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historical accident." 76 Given that Fannie and Freddie were created by the federal government, they would seem to be immune from the charge of "willful acquisition or maintenance." Moreover, the federal government has already designed a regulatory regime with which it can evaluate Fannie and
Freddie's past behavior and mold their future actions. 77 Thus, it seems (a conclusion that is further supported by the absence of litigation regarding this issue) that the two companies do not violate the Sherman Act.
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One might also wonder whether Fannie and Freddie are best described as duopolists or oligopolists. The fewer firms there are in a market, the more likely they are to act like duopolists. collusion can take the form of failing to vigorously compete. It is also more likely where potential duopolists can monitor their competitors for "cheating" (that is, attempting to take more market share by competing more vigorously). This is easier to do "where the number of firms in the industry is small, the firms are similar in product offerings and technology, the firms have frequent interactions through the process of attracting customers, and it is easy for the firms to observe the actions of their competitors." 80 As Robert Seiler makes clear, Fannie and Freddie have a number of the characteristics of duopolists: there are only two of them; they finance similar mortgages, they use similar technology and they have frequent interactions. 81 Seiler does note that the two firms cannot directly monitor the terms that the other has negotiated with lenders who provide them with loans. Seiler finds, however, that
Fannie and Freddie can indirectly monitor each other such that they can maintain the equilibrium necessary to act as a duopoly. 82 There is also some empirical support for the claim that Fannie and
Freddie have opportunities to collude, based on their historically high profits. 83 Thus, Fannie and Freddie are best described as duopolists in the conforming residential mortgage market.
84
V. Conclusion
Because their duopoly is the result of government-granted privileges (and is not a natural monopoly), it is suspect from the perspective of competition theory.
They achieved that goal. Because they were also profit-driven private companies, they also developed lines of business which allowed them to dominate the conforming mortgage market to the exclusion of all competitors. As a result, they grew extraordinarily large. Because of the risks that they took and because of the extraordinary conditions throughout the mortgage market in the last few years, they became critically undercapitalized such that the federal government found it necessary to place them in conservatorship. While this particular crisis shall cost the American taxpayer hundreds of billions to rectify, it also presents an opportunity to rethink whether the Fannie/Freddie duopoly is still necessary for a healthy residential mortgage market in the United States. And clearly the burden of proof rests on
Fannie and Freddie to demonstrate that their duopoly does serve the public interest. 
